Most participants judged that the conditions for policy firming had not yet been achieved; a number of them cautioned against a premature decision. Many participants emphasized that, in order to determine that the criteria for beginning policy normalization had been met, they would need additional information indicating that economic growth was strengthening, that labor market conditions were continuing to improve, and that inflation was moving back toward the Committee's objective.

Pero, algunos menos...

They identified several possible risks associated with delaying the start of policy firming. One such risk was the possibility that the Committee might need to tighten more rapidly than financial markets currently anticipate-an outcome that could be associated with a significant rise in longer-term interest rates or heightened financial market volatility. Another was that prolonging a high degree of monetary policy accommodation might result in an undesirable increase in inflation or might have adverse consequences for financial and macroeconomic stability. It was also pointed out that a prompt start to normalization would likely convey the Committee's confidence in prospects for the economy.

En definitiva, septiembre sigue siendo la mejor de las posibilidades para comenzar la subida de tipos. Aunque la mención a Grecia en las Actas parece restarle peso.
Ayer Williams de la Fed consideró que, pese a Grecia y a China, la opción por dos subidas de tipos antes de final de año sigue siendo lo más probable.
Veremos.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20150617.pdf

Un resumen de lo principal de las Actas....

They generally agreed that labor market conditions had improved somewhat over the intermeeting period, variously citing solid increases in payroll employment and job openings; low levels of unemployment insurance claims; and, despite an unchanged unemployment rate, some further reduction in broader measures of underutilization, particularly among those not actively searching for jobs, but available and interested in work. Several participants pointed to some favorable trends that had developed over a longer period, such as the flattening out of the labor force participation rate and a shift in the flow of workers into more stable and higher-skilled jobs. A number of participants noted that the outlook for continued job gains was evident in reports on hiring intentions from business contacts in their Districts who indicated that more firms planned additions to their payrolls over the coming year than a year earlier. While the cumulative improvements in labor market conditions over the past year had been substantial, most participants judged that further progress would be required to eliminate underutilization of labor resources; some of them anticipated that the utilization gap would close around the end of the year. Several other participants indicated that, in their view, labor market slack had already been largely eliminated. The ongoing rise in labor demand appeared to have begun to result in a firming of wage increases. Recent readings on the employment cost index, hourly compensation, and average hourly earnings of employees suggested some acceleration in wages.

Nonetheless, a couple of participants continued to be concerned that the extended period of low inflation might persist and feed through to inflation expectations, citing estimates from various inflation forecasting models and the downtrend in the 10-year CPI projections in the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

In their discussion of financial market developments over the intermeeting period, several participants commented on the rise in the 10-year Treasury yield, which accompanied a steeper run-up in the 10-year German yield. The sharp rise in German yields appeared to reflect a retracing of the earlier decline in German rates to unsustainably low levels. It was noted that the increase in U.S. yields was not especially large in a historical context and that volatility in U.S. fixed-income markets was still somewhat below pre-crisis levels. However, many participants expressed concern that a failure of Greece and its official creditors to resolve their differences could result in disruptions in financial markets in the euro area, with possible spillover effects on the United States. And some participants reiterated the importance of effective Committee communications in reducing the likelihood of an outsized financial market reaction around the time that policy normalization begins.

Most participants judged that the conditions for policy firming had not yet been achieved; a number of them cautioned against a premature decision. Many participants emphasized that, in order to determine that the criteria for beginning policy normalization had been met, they would need additional information indicating that economic growth was strengthening, that labor market conditions were continuing to improve, and that inflation was moving back toward the Committee's objective. Other concerns that were mentioned were the potential erosion of the Committee's credibility if inflation were to persist below 2 percent and the limited ability of monetary policy to offset downside shocks to inflation and economic activity when the federal funds rate was at its effective lower bound. Some participants viewed the economic conditions for increasing the target range for the federal funds rate as having been met or were confident that they would be met shortly. They identified several possible risks associated with delaying the start of policy firming. One such risk was the possibility that the Committee might need to tighten more rapidly than financial markets currently anticipate-an outcome that could be associated with a significant rise in longer-term interest rates or heightened financial market volatility. Another was that prolonging a high degree of monetary policy accommodation might result in an undesirable increase in inflation or might have adverse consequences for financial and macroeconomic stability. It was also pointed out that a prompt start to normalization would likely convey the Committee's confidence in prospects for the economy. During the discussion, a number of participants recommended that, around the time of the first increase in the target range, the Committee consider how it would update its communications regarding the likely path of the federal funds rate, with several indicating that the Committee should remain data dependent in making adjustments to the target range.




José Luis Martínez Campuzano
Estratega de Citi en España